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ABSTRACT 
This paper proposes to create a taxonomy of separation 
conflicts between Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS) and 
intruding aircrafts to facilitate its insertion in non-
segregated airspace. The classification is created according 
to the relative speeds, angular geometry, initial intent, etc. 
A catalog of separation maneuvers that best fit each 
scenario is introduced and evaluated through a real-time 
simulation environment. This advisory mechanism will 
benefit both the UAS pilot and the ATCo in order to 
negotiate the best suited separation maneuver. Eventually, 
the same strategy can be employed as an autonomous 
separation system on-board a UAS that suffers a lost-link 
contingency, alleviating its negative impact in the airspace. 
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General Terms 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
In aviation, two main functionalities are employed to 
minimize the probability of collision with other aircraft: 
separation assurance and collision avoidance. Separation 
assurance aims at keeping minimum distances between the 
aircraft and potential intruders. A loss of separation is 
considered a serious issue and ideally, it should never 
occur. As an additional safety layer, collision avoidance 
can prevent an imminent collision in case of a loss of 
separation as a last resort maneuver. 
Manned aviation already implements some Airborne 
Collision Avoidance Systems (ACAS), such as the Traffic 
Collision Avoidance System (TCAS). Moreover, regarding 
today's developed Air Traffic Control (ATC) systems, the 
Short Term Conflict Alert (STCA) system can also alert the 
Air Traffic Control operator (ATCo) of short term 
potentially conflicting flight paths. The STCA is not 
intended to be a separation assurance tool and like its 
airborne counterpart (the ACAS), it is used as an additional 
safety net [1]. 
Other collision avoidance systems, ranging from abstract 
concepts to prototype systems being evaluated or used in 
laboratories, have also been proposed aiming at increasing 
levels of automation in air traffic conflict detection and 
resolution (see [2] for a review on this topic). These 
algorithms typically compute the future position of the 
aircraft based on projections of the current aircraft states 
into the future. The performance of these algorithms is 
rapidly degraded if the time horizon of the prediction 
increases, due to the inherent uncertainties in aircraft flight 
paths. Nevertheless, since collision avoidance is considered 
as a last resort maneuver, these detection times can be 
sufficiently small to still achieve good results in the 
predictions. Obviously, the same methodology cannot be 
applied for separation assurance purposes. 
On top of the ACAS systems, separation in controlled 
airspace is typically responsibility of the ATCo, which 
issue clearances to the aircraft in order to maintain 
minimum separation values. Some systems, have already 
been proposed to increase the automation levels of these 
manual separation assurance processes. For example, as an 
ATCo support tool, the Medium Term Collision Detection 
(MTCD) system computes initially the trajectory of the 
aircraft from the flight plan using performance parameters 
and meteorological information and then, refines it by 
monitoring the actual performance of the aircraft [3]. 
Similar concepts are brought at cockpit level with the 
Airborne Separation Assurance Systems (ASAS), which 
aim to delegate separation from controllers to pilots [4]. 
During the last decade, the interest of using Unmanned 
Aerial Systems (UAS) for civil missions and applications 
has increased significantly [6]. Yet, the lack of a regulation 
basis concerning their certification, airworthiness and 
operations is still banning them into non-segregated 
airspace [7]. Among all UAS applications, surveillance 
missions will be perhaps the most numerous [9]. 
Most Unmanned Aircraft (UA) will have poorer flight 
performance than commercial airliners (in terms of cruise 
speed and climb/descent performance, for instance), but 
will likely operate at very similar altitudes. Additionally, 
peculiarities like communication latencies and, in the worst 
case, the loss of data-link with the UAS should also be 
considered. 
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Figure 1: Overview of the UAS separation conflict geometries. 
For all these reasons, the conflict detection and resolution 
functionality can become an issue in a real UAS 
implementation. While extensive research has been devoted 
to collision avoidance algorithms that take into account the 
particularities of UAS, most of them inheriting from 
robotics and control theory applications [8-14]; few 
researchers have addressed the separation problem for 
UAS. Some proposals indeed, implement separation 
minima in their algorithms (like for instance [9]), but they 
are in general focused in very small UAS and typical 
separation values are in the order of meters. Yet, if larger 
UAS are expected to fly into non-segregated airspace, 
ICAO compliant separation values (such as 5 NM) have to 
be addressed [15]. 
This work focuses on the evaluation of separation 
maneuvers for UAS and analyzes a number of scenarios 
where a UAS enters in conflict with a much faster airplane 
flying at similar altitudes (see Figure 1(a) for an overview 
of the considered scenarios). Different requirements are 
analyzed in terms of heading changes and minimum 
reaction times in order to maintain separation between both 
aircraft, assuming that the intentions of both are known.  
The evaluation of separation conflicts according to the 
speeds, angular geometry, initial intent, etc.; allows us to 
determine that the classical vector-based separation 
maneuvers may not be sufficient for a wide spectrum of 
conflict configurations. Moreover, vector-based maneuvers 
may have an extremely negative impact on the UAS 
mission. As a result this paper introduces and evaluates a 
catalog of separation maneuvers, classifying the most 
suitable one for each conflict configuration, thus proposing 
a reaction taxonomy. 
These maneuvers can guarantee the maximum separation 
rate while minimizing the negative impact on a 
hypothetical surveillance mission of the UAS. The 
soundness of the concept will be validated in a real-time 
simulation environment that combines a detailed UAS 
operation with an air traffic simulation environment. Initial 
experiments indicate the feasibility of the concept, although 
additional experiments need to be developed in order to 
determine the workload for the ATCo and the potential 
impact on surrounding traffic. 
Once properly evaluated this taxonomy may become an 
automated advisory mechanism that can benefit both the 
pilot and the ATCo in order to negotiate the best suited 
separation maneuver. In a long term scenario this 
mechanism may even become partially/fully autonomous in 
case UAS separation capabilities need to be considered to 
support lost-link or high latency communication situations. 
2. SEPARATION CONFLICT GEOMETRIES 
One of the most important factors when detecting and 
solving a separation conflict is the relative flight 
performance between the conflicting aircraft. With the 
possible introduction of UAS into civil non-segregated 
airspace, separation conflicts between UAS and 
conventional airliners may occur. Such conflict geometries 
need to take into account the notable differences in flight 
performance between the UAS and such an intruder. It 
might happen that changing the UAS flight level, in order 
to maintain separation, would not be a possible solution due 
to the poor climbing or descending performance of the 
UAS at cruise altitudes. Similarly, changing the UAS 
heading will have to be executed well in advance if the 
UAS is flying at a speed significantly slower than the 
intruder. 
This section evaluates a number of simple conflict 
scenarios between a typical MALE UAS (a GA MQ-9 
Reaper
1
 and a jet airliner intruder, assuming that both 
aircraft will remain at the same altitude and that separation 
will be guaranteed by changing the heading of one of the 
aircraft. Minimum separation values of 3.0 NM and 5.0 
NM are retained in the following simulations. Furthermore, 
since UAS operations might be subject to higher separation 
minima (to consider, for instance, latency issues, lost-of-
link emergencies, etc.), we have also considered a 
hypothetical separation of 10 NM as illustrative example of 
an increased radar separation value. 
Conflict and aircraft performance models 
Figure1(b) summarizes a simplified conflict geometry used 
in this paper. An airliner is located in point A. We assume 
that it is flying at a constant speed v and altitude. At the 
same time a UAS is placed at point B. We will also 
consider that it is flying at a constant speed u and at 
conflicting altitude with the airliner. Both aircraft are 
moving towards the same position in space (point C).  
                                                          
1
 performances obtained from 
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Figure 2: Separation geometries for a maneuvering UAS with conflict angles at 180º and 0º. 
Points A and B are placed in such a way that both aircraft 
will arrive to C at the same time. In order to avoid this 
conflict we assume that the ATCo commands the UAS 
(placed in B) to change its heading (h). We want to know 
which is the minimum absolute distance between both 
aircraft dsep, along their flight paths, as a function of h. 
We still have a degree of freedom to place points A and B: 
the Time to Conflict (tc). This time is defined as the amount 
of time elapsed between the instant the aircraft changes its 
heading to start the separation maneuver, and the time that 
both aircraft would have meet if no heading changes were 
applied (i.e. the time when both aircraft reach C). 
Regarding to the performance model, only the speed of 
each aircraft (at the considered altitude) has been taken into 
account. An Airbus A320 with cruise speed of 500 kt and a 
Predator-B with cruise speed of 170 kt are considered. 
Forward separation conflicts 
We define a forward conflict as a particular case of the 
conflict model, when β ≈ 180º. In this case, each aircraft 
will move towards each other with the maximum possible 
relative speed for the v and u considered before. 
Our analysis for this scenario is shown in Figure 2(a). The 
plot exposes the simulation results when the UAS performs 
the separation heading change (either left or right). The x-
axis plots the time since the conflict has been detected 
normalized to a fixed time to conflict of 5 minutes) while, 
in the y-axis, the minimum absolute distance between 
aircraft is depicted. Each line represents a different heading 
change discretized in steps of 10º (from 0º up to 90º). 
As expected, the higher h, the larger minimum separation 
distance achieved (indicated by the perpendicular segment 
crossing all curves). At least a h = 50º heading change is 
necessary to achieve a minimum separation distance of 10 
NM. Even if a h = 90º is applied the maximum separation 
minima that can be guaranteed is well below 20 NM. 
Backward separation conflicts 
We define a backward conflict as a particular case of the 
conflict model, when β ≈ 0o. In contrast to the previous 
case, both aircraft have the same heading. Therefore, the 
fastest airliner will move towards the UAS, chasing it, with 
the minimum possible relative speed between them. Figure 
2(b) shows the simulation results for this case when the 
UAS performs the separation heading change (either left or 
right). If a lateral separation of 5 NM is required, and the 
conflict has been detected 5 minutes in advance, a 
minimum heading change of h = 30º is necessary if the 
ATCo commanded the UAS to perform the separation 
maneuver. However, if a separation of 10 NM is necessary, 
not even a h = 90º will provide such separation minima. 
Backward conflicts are more stringent and some conflict 
geometries may become unsolvable. If the ATCo 
commands a separation maneuver with shorter look ahead 
time, e.g. tc = 2 minutes (the typical STCA look ahead 
time), the minimum separation distance between both 
aircraft cannot be achieved regardless the selected h. 
Lateral separation conflicts 
We define a lateral conflict as any oblique conflict 
geometry such that β ≈ 90º or β ≈ 270º. Both conflict 
geometries are equivalent being the only relevant factor the 
direction in which the UAS is going to turn, to face the 
incoming intruder or away from it. The resulting analysis is 
shown in Figure 3, where the UAS turns facing the intruder 
in 3(a), and away from the intruder 3(b), regardless of β. 
Note that for any oblique conflict geometries y-axis 
symmetry disappears. Therefore, depending on the conflict 
geometry, turning towards the conflict may be better than 
turning away from it or vice versa for a given h. 
Figure 3(b) clearly shows that turning away from the 
conflicts does not provide any valuable separation until 
heading change of h ≈ 60º, in which a 5 NM separation is 
almost achieved. Values closer to 10 NM can only be 
achieved with h ≈ 90º. On the other side, Figure 3(a) 
shows that by turning against the conflict with h ≈ 40º, 
allows to achieve something closer to the 5 NM separation 
limit, while 10 NM can only be achieved with h ≈ 70º. 
Oblique separation conflicts 
We define an oblique conflict as any conflict geometry 
such that β ≈ 45º or β ≈ 135º (and the symmetric 
counterparts
 β ≈ 315º or β ≈ 225º). Note that again, there are 
large separation differences if turning towards the conflict 
or away from the conflict. In this case only the optimal 
solution is analyzed. 
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Figure 3: Separation geometries for a maneuvering UAS with conflict angles at 90º turning facing the intruder and 90º
 
turning away from the intruder.
Figure 4(a) shows the resulting scenario for β ≈ 45º, in 
which the UAS turns away from the intruder. In this 
scenario, small changes in heading provide a rapid increase 
in the minimum separation; i.e. 5 NM separations can be 
achieved with h ≈ 30º, and a 10 NM separation is 
achievable with h ≈ 50º. Figure 5 depicts the same results 
when the UAS turns to the opposite direction. As it can be 
clearly seen separation values are not sufficient to 
guarantee the safety of the operation. 
3. TAXONOMY OF UAS SEPARATION MANEUVERS 
Separation conflicts between a UAS and an airliner can be 
better solved if the last performs the heading change due to 
its better performance parameters. Only in the case that the 
Time to Conflict is big enough, the separation can be 
totally assured by means of changing the UAS heading. 
Moreover, there are specific scenarios where this aspect 
becomes important, such as backward conflicts, when, 
instead of having only one airliner chasing the UAS, we 
could have several ones that follow the same airway. In this 
case, it will be easier for the ATCo to command a single 
heading change to the UAS than disrupting the trajectory of 
all the pursuers. 
Given the UAS performance limitations and mission 
constraints it becomes obvious that it is necessary to design 
UAS specific separation maneuvers for all possible 
geometric configurations, but also from the UAS pilot and 
ATCo situational awareness. This section presents or 
selection of separation maneuvers, specific for UAS 
considering both en-route and UAS mission flight phases. 
General strategy 
Our proposal strictly focuses on separation maneuvers in 
which the UAS performs the heading change. Separation 
minima of 10 NM will be targeted based on a time to 
conflict of 5 min. Although standard separations fall in the 
3/5 NM range, 10 NM is employed as a way to cover the 
UAS turning limitations, communication latencies and 
decision time. Future work will fully addresses this factors, 
but then the 3/5 NM range will be targeted (unless 
rulemaking decisions specify that UAS require wider 
separations than manned aviation). The time to conflict 
range is used as a uniform way to treat conflict detection 
ranges, and it is fully compatible with the strategy 
employed to specify the ADS-B MASPS [16]. 
Forward and backward separation maneuvers 
For the en-route flight phase, and from a geometric point of 
view, the best way to obtain proper lateral separation is to 
change the UAS heading in such a way that the minimum 
separation distance is maximized (in this way, the 
minimum separation value is achieved as soon as possible). 
Both the forward conflict geometry, β ≈ 180º and the 
backward conflict geometry, β ≈ 0º are clear representatives 
of this scenario (recall Figure 2). 
If a 10 NM separation needs to be guaranteed, the forward 
separation conflict requires a heading change of around h 
≈ 50º, while the backward conflict requires a maximum 
separation maneuver h ≈ 90º to barely achieve 8-9 NM. 
Under these circumstances for both β ≈ 180º β ≈ 0º, Figure 
6(a) describes our proposed separation maneuver. An 
almost maximum turn maneuver is prescribed until the 
UAS reached a position D that guarantees the required 
separation (dsep). A heading change h ≈ 90º
 
is generally 
required, although it could be more relaxed in case of a 
forward conflict. Once position D is reached, the UAS will 
turn again following its original track until a position E is 
reached in which the conflict is cleared. Then, the UAS will 
keep the same heading for a buffer safety time (reaching 
Eext) before returning to the original flight plan by changing 
its heading to a value h’ < 90º. Both the cleared conflict 
position E and its safety extension will strongly depend on 
the orientation of the conflict and the targeted separation. 
Note that if β ≠ 180º or β ≠ 0º, the separation maneuver 
needs to be executed either right range of or left according 
to the direction that maximizes the separation distance that 
will be obtained once point D is reached. Moreover, later in 
the section we will identify which conflict angles (β) will 
be considered as forward/backward conflicts. 
Given this basic separation maneuver, operational 
deficiencies may rise due to the peculiarities of the UAS 
performance and its operational nature. 
Forward and backward separation conflicts are most likely 
due to the operation of a UAS over an airway. Airliners 
operate on busy airways with well-defined timed 
separations, designed according to the homogenous cruise 
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Figure 4: Separation geometries for a maneuvering UAS with conflict angles at 45º and 135º. 
performance that most of them exhibit. In case a UAS faces 
a separation conflict with multiple airliners, it may not be 
the reasonable to force the UAS to maintain a separation 
track longer that certain values. Most likely the UAS would 
like to stick to the original track because its mission may be 
directly related to the capacity of perform surveillance on 
that specific area. If this is the case, Figure 6(a) also depicts 
two alternative procedures that may be more beneficial to 
the UAS operation. 
Instead of following a track parallel to the original route, 
the UAS may enter a holding track while maintain the 
desired safety separation. This holding track may be 
executed following the original UAS heading (in this case 
the forward conflict will be cleared earlier); or following a 
reverse course (now the backward conflict will be cleared 
earlier). The optimality of the maneuver fully depends on 
the original UAS mission and on the fact that the fragment 
of the original flight plan that will be left unexplored needs 
to be re-explored. 
Oblique separation maneuvers 
Both forward and backward oblique conflicts require a 
variable heading change relative to the angle β of the 
incoming intruder. In order to provide a generalized 
separation solution; but also to clearly identify the limits of 
β that can be considered as oblique, lateral or 
forward/backward, a uniform separation strategy is being 
considered. This common strategy is depicted in Figure 
6(b) for forward oblique conflicts, while Figure 6(c) depicts 
the same strategy for backward oblique conflicts. 
The separation strategy as depicted in Figure 6(b) suggests 
that the UAS will turn towards the intruder with a heading 
change h equivalent to the angle of conflict β. The result 
is that the UAS will take a parallel track to the intruder, in 
which the separation between both tracks will depend on 
the angle β and on the point in which the separation is 
initiated (here assumed instantaneous). Note that under our 
specific scenario (tc = 5 min and relative speed between 
both aircraft), the UAS distance to the conflict point is 
around 14.16 NM. 
The separation maneuver makes the UAS to turn towards 
the conflict and keep a parallel track until a point E is 
reached in which the conflict is cleared. A certain safety 
margin is added by extending the track until Eext is reached. 
Then the UAS may turn directly to the original track, or it 
may extend some additional safety margin following the 
initial heading before heading back to the original track. 
According to the conflict angle and specific speeds two 
critical factors need to be identified in order to guarantee 
the safety of the maneuver: 
1. The minimum separation distance (dmin). 
2. Time to reach dmin and thus to clear the conflict. 
Figure 7 shows minimum separation distance that can be 
achieved related to the UAS heading change and the 
selected time to conflict. The shaded area corresponds to 
the acceptable heading changes when a given minimum 
separation needs to be guaranteed, assuming a tc of 5 
minutes. The remaining curves specify the same 
relationship for different tc values. 
The results show that to guarantee a 10 NM minimum 
separation the heading change (h) may range between 40º 
to 90º; that is, oblique separation conflicts can be safely 
cleared with the proposed maneuver if the conflict angle β 
is within the [90º-140º] range. Conflicts with β within the 
[140º-180º] range need to be considered as forward 
conflicts and the maneuvers described in Figure 6(a) apply. 
The same principle applies for backward conflicts as shown 
in Figure 6(c). Here, both β and h are equivalent; thus, 
valid ranges for oblique backward conflicts lay within the 
[40º-90º] interval; while pure backward conflicts need to be 
considered in the [0º-40º] interval. 
Once angular ranges have been determined, we have to 
identify the time required to reach the minimum separation 
distance. This time determines a safety minimum in order 
to clear the conflict and then proceed back into the original 
flight plan. However, the time to dmin is not symmetrical for 
both forward and backward conflicts as seen in Figure 8. 
Figures 8(a) and (b) describe the time to dmin corresponding 
to the maneuver scenarios described in Figures 6(b) and 
6(c) respectively. Figure 8(a) demonstrates that the time to 
dmin progressively decreases when the heading change h 
increases. For the limit case in which h ≈ 90º, the intruded 
will be cleared in just over 3.7 minutes, but if h ≈ 60º the 
conflict will only be cleared after 4.4 minutes. Obviously  
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Figure 5: Separation geometries for a maneuvering UAS with conflict angles at 45
o
 and 135
o 
responding on the opposite side 
than the separation maneuver described in Figure 4. 
the time required to clear the conflict depends on the 
relative speed of both aircrafts. Figure 8(a) depicts value 
ranges for our standard intruder flying at 500 kt, but also 
for slower intruders down to the 300 kt range. In case an 
oblique backward conflict exists, Figure 8(b) shows that the 
time to dmin progressively increases with the heading 
change h. Again, for the limit case in which h ≈ 90º, the 
intruded can be cleared only after well over 7.5 minutes, 
but if h ≈ 60º the conflict be cleared after 6.2 minutes. As 
in Figure 8(a), different speed ranges are shown, from the 
500 kt basic value down to 300 kt. In that case it can be 
appreciated that the geometry is much more sensitive to 
speed variation as the relative speed between the 
conflicting aircraft is greatly reduced. 
Lateral separation maneuvers 
Oblique conflicts in which the conflict angle is close to β ≈ 
90º
 
are identified as lateral conflicts, and represent a 
different class of separation conflict in itself. Applying the 
separation maneuver employed for oblique conflicts 
requires the UAS to perform a radical heading change that 
may have a negative impact on the UAS mission. 
Moreover, keeping the UAS under this new heading until 
the conflict is cleared may greatly separate the UAS from 
its initial trajectory. However, the numerical analysis 
performed so far demonstrates that in this type of conflict 
the UAS is well clear of the path of the intruder, up to 14 
NM to the collision point for a 5 min time to conflict. 
Moreover, if the h ≈ 90º separation maneuver is executed, 
the UAS will travel up to 3.3 minutes until the conflict is 
cleared (maybe 4 minutes to add some security margin). In 
that case the UAS will separate more than 11 NM from its 
original track. Deriving alternative maneuvers for lateral 
conflicts may reduce the negative impact on the original 
trajectory and on the surrounding traffic, as the UAS may 
keep closer to its initial intentions. 
Figure 9 outlines our proposed strategy for lateral conflicts. 
The objective is to keep the UAS well-clear of the intruder 
path, thus a 10 NM boundary may be created between any 
UAS maneuver and the flight plan of the airliner. Without 
trespassing this boundary the UAS may execute a holding 
maneuver that delays is forward movement (in the future 
speed modifications may be also combined to reduce the 
total amount of involved maneuvering). As described in the 
figure, the UAS has two alternatives: (1) it may perform a 
left-turn holding track overlapped to its initial trajectory 
waiting the conflict to be cleared (at least 5 minutes will be 
necessary). (2) Or it may perform a similar holding track 
turning towards the incoming intruder. In that case the time 
to conflict may be slightly reduced (maybe around 1 
minute); thus the UAS may proceed forward earlier and 
later on turn progressively to retake its original track. In 
both cases the amount of maneuvering is increased, but 
overall the negative impact on the UAS mission will be 
reduced as the vehicle may remain closer to its intended 
surveillance area.
 
Figure 6: Maneuvers for (a) forward and backward conflicts, (b) forward oblique conflict and (c) backward oblique conflict. 
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4. UAS AUTONOMY AND SAFETY MARGINS 
This research assumes that the UAS always performs the 
separation maneuver. However, UAS maneuvering for 
separation has two limiting factors that need to be taken 
into account: (1) the complexity of the conflict-detection 
and maneuver-decision process due to the remote nature of 
the operation; and (2) the limited UAS turning capability. 
Figure 10 outlines the main elements that affect the 
separation-decision process in a UAS system. First of all, 
the separation conflict detection may take place onboard 
the UAS thanks to the ADS-B technology; or on the ground 
thanks to ADS-C, ATC radar or any future service 
available through SWIM technology. Conflict detection 
and the identification of the optimum separation maneuver 
may happen both on the air and on the ground. 
Messages should be sent from the UAS avionics down to 
the control station notifying the separation conflicts and the 
separation advisories generated by the onboard avionics. 
UAS information needs to be correlated to any ground-
based source to guarantee its coherence. Only then a valid 
resolution may be taken by the pilot. This separation 
resolution must be notified to the UAS as soon as possible 
so that the separation maneuver is initiated. 
Overall, additional latency due to communication delays 
will happen. This delay needs to be added to the inherent 
turning limitations of the UAS and the pilot resolution time 
under a limited-awareness environment. 
UAS communication delays introduce a new dimension 
due to the possibility of a permanent/temporal loss of the 
command&control link between the pilot and the UAS. It is 
our believe that the UAS avionics needs to monitor the 
pilot’s response time and autonomously apply the 
separation resolution computed onboard if no response is 
received in a reasonable time period. 
 
 
Figure 7: Minimum separation distance related to the 
heading change when a parallel track is selected. 
In case a well-identified lost-link occurs, it may be decided 
that the UAS will not perform any autonomous separation 
maneuver. Autonomous separation will add additional 
uncertainty to the UAS flight-path, which is highly 
undesired. In that case, with a UAS under a declared 
emergency, the ATCo may command the intruder to initiate 
the separation maneuver. However, a lost-link or a 
temporal communication glitch may happen at any time, 
which may become catastrophic if it is combined with a 
separation conflict. 
The limited turning capability of the UAS comes into help 
in this situation. As Figure 11 demonstrates when the high 
speed intruder maneuvers to avoid the separation conflict, 
higher separation values are achieved in less time and with 
limited heading changes. Overall, if a separation conflict 
occurs combined with an unexpected lost link scenario and 
additional safety margin exits so that the manned intruder 
 
Figure 8: Time to reach the minimum separation distance according to the UAS heading change for (a) forward oblique 
conflicts and (b) backward oblique conflicts. 
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Figure 9: Strategy for lateral conflicts in which the UAS 
minimizes its deviation from the original track. 
can still be commanded to initiate a safe separation 
maneuver. Further analysis is required to identify the exact 
time margins available for each conflict geometry. 
 
Figure 10: Conflict detection and separation decision 
process in a UAS system. 
5. EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION  
Conflicts generated due to the insertion of UAS into non-
segregated airspace while being simulated by a 
combination of a real-time UAS simulation environment 
called ISIS and Eurocontrol's eDEP (Early Demonstration 
and Evaluation Platform) ATC simulation tool. Figure 12 
depicts a sequence of conflicting traffic used as test 
benchmark that the simulated UAS needs to negotiate. 
In this environment the UAS awareness system detects the 
intruder through the incoming ADS-B/C messages so that 
the best suited separation maneuver can be selected by the 
UAS pilot. At the same time, the ATCo position in eDEP 
permits to visualize the development of the separation 
conflict using both the tactical and strategic tools typically 
available to them. 
ISIS includes a Human Machine Interface (HMI) to support 
the separation maneuver selection (see Figure 13). The  
 
Figure 11: Separation geometry for maneuvering intruder 
with conflict angle at 0º. 
pilot can preview two different maneuvers and update their 
parameters in real time. Once a maneuver is selected it 
must be committed so that the UAS executes it and later 
returns to the nominal flight plan. Flight time estimation is 
also computed so that the geometry of the separation 
conflict can be re-evaluated. Maximum separation, 
dimensions of the holding pattern, number of iterations for 
holding tracks (from 0 to N), right/left turn can be trimmed 
to requirements. The geometry and the incoming conflict is 
recomputed every second so that the pilot has enough time 
and information to properly evaluate the situation and react 
to ATCo requests. 
 
Figure 12: Conflicting traffic in the eDEP visual interface. 
Figure 14 depicts a number of conflict situations as seen 
from the ISIS visual interface. In these images the UAS 
performs different maneuvers. For the forward conflicts, 
the UAS is turning right in order to enter into a holding 
track while maintain the desired safety separation. In this 
case, the holding track is executed following the original 
UAS course. The UAS keeps in the holding pattern letting 
several conflicting aircrafts to go by while keeping the 
desired safety separation (6NM). Figure 15 shows as the 
separation between aircrafts decreases for DAL0, increases 
for DAL1 as the UAS is on the other side of the holding 
pattern, and returns to the minimum safety values for DAL2. 
In case of a backward conflict, the UAS turns right to gain 
separation, and enters a holding pattern in a reverse course. 
Figure 15 shows that no maneuver was executed to avoid 
DAL0, while both DAL1 and DAL2 are maintained within the 
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Figure 13: Interface for the manual selection of the separation maneuvers (forward/backward are depicted). 
 
Figure 14: Maneuvering sequences in order to avoid the sequence of conflicting aircraft simulated within eDEP and ISIS. 
desired target separation. Finally, for a lateral conflict a 
holding maneuver is executed designed to avoid 
proceeding further in the flightplan, thus maintaining 
separation with DAL1 and DAL2 as seen in Figure 15 (note 
that DAL0 never becomes a real separation conflict). 
Current research includes the development of automated 
services that will compute the optimum parameters for the 
separation maneuver once the whole spectrum of 
UAS/intruder performances have been characterized. 
6. CONCLUSIONS 
This paper introduces a research on the separation conflict 
scenarios that a UAS may encounter once operating in 
non-segregated airspace. Conflict geometries and 
separation maneuvers have been explored for a particular 
performance instance for both the intruder and the UAS. 
Our results suggest that specific separation maneuver may  
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Figure 15: Separation distances as tracked during the 
combined eDEP-ISIS simulation. 
be needed both from the point of view of the limited 
performance of the UAS and from the negative impact 
that separation maneuvers may have on the UAS mission. 
This work is an initial step towards the analysis of 
generalized separation conflict geometries. Wider ranges 
of performances need to be evaluated, but also critical 
elements that may have a large impact on the separation 
decision need to be considered like communication 
latencies, turning limitations when operating at high 
altitudes, the impact of speed changes, etc. Future work 
needs to take into account the human factor for both the 
pilot and the ATCo, hence realistic simulation scenarios 
will be created, and both pilot and ATCo confronted to 
them to evaluate reactions and workload. 
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